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IN THE SUP'REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J<~DW ARD ~WILSON AMMERMAN, t 
hy his Guardian Ad Litem, La Verna 
Bruce Ammerman, and EDDIE 
SOLIZ, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, \ 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE 
gXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Appellant. ~ 
Case No. 
10,574: 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATRMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiffs and respondent against 
defendant and appellant to recover the amount of a 
judgment in favor of Eddie Soliz and against Edward 
Wilson Ammennan in excess o.f the liability insurance 
prnvided by Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the trial the jury returned a verdict in favor 
of plaintiffs and against defendant. Judgment in accord-
ance with the jury verdict was entered by the Court on 
February -±, 1966, N unc Pro Tune to January 11, 1966. 
1 
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After the return of the jury verdict defendant made 
the following motions: (1) For Judgment Notwithstand-
ing the Jury Verdict, (2) For a New Trial, and (3) To 
Set Aside, Amend and Correct the Judgment, all of which 
motions were denied. Thereafter defendant initiated this 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks to have the action of the trial court 
affirmed in entering judgment on the jury verdict and 
in denying appellant's several motions. 
STATEMENT OF F.A:CTS 
On March 21 1962, Edward Wilson Anunerman was 
an insured and entitled to the benefits and coverages of 
an automobile liability insurance policy No. 76-662554797, 
issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange and which pro~ 
vided, among other things, indemnity for injury to other 
persons with a limit of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per 
accident arising from the operation of an automible 
('Rl, 13, 100). On that date, while operating an auto-
mobile, Mr. Ammerman collided with an automobile 
owned and operated by plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, causing 
personal injury to him and damage to his automobile. 
Suit was filed by Mr. Soliz against Mr. Ammerman 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County seeking dam-
ages for personal injuries in the sum of $35,000 (Exhibit 
P-4). At that time Farmers Insurance Exchange retained 
the law firm o.f Hanson and Garrett to def end Mr. 
Ammerman, pursuant to the terms of the policy (R56 -
2 
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Part I of insurance policy) requiring it to do so. Mr. 
Ammerman retained Attorney Reed Richards of the 
law firm of McKay and Burton to represent him in the 
matter, and more particularly in relation to the claim 
in excess of the policy limits (Exhibit P-5). 
Shortly after the accident, Mr. Soliz was seen and 
E'xamined by Dr. David E. Smith, Jr., a general practi-
tioner in Salt Lake City. Because of Mr. Soliz' continued 
difficulty with neck and back pain Dr. Smith suspected 
an injury in that area and ref erred him to Dr. D. C. 
Bernson, a reputable and respected neurosugeon in Salt 
Lake City. Dr. Bernson examined Mr. Soliz on at least 
four occasions between May 23, 1962 and September 24, 
1962 (Exhibit P-7). In addition to the complete physical 
examination, Dr. Bernson also performed a discogram 
on Mr. Soliz while the latter was a patient in the L.D.S. 
Hospital for that purpose, and examined x-rays taken 
by Dr. Irwin F. Winters and x-rays that he had ordered 
taken. 
Following the initial physical examination of Mr. 
Soliz and examination of the x-rays, Dr. Bernson detected 
an increase in motion between the 5th and 6th cervical 
vertebra (Exhibit P-7). At the time of the second exam-
ination on June 20, 1962, he detected an increase in grip 
strength in the left hand and a grip decrease in the right 
hand. There was also a weakening of the left and right 
bicepts reflex. At the third examination on August 4, 
1962, because of Mr. Soliz' continued difficulty with back 
and neck pain, and because there was a marked loss of 
strength in the right upper extremity to 40 lbs. which 
3 
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represented a 55 lh., loss smce the prior examination 
of June 20, 1962, Dr. Bernson was o.f the opinion that 
Mr. Soliz could vt>ry well have had a ruptured disc or 
discs and he, therefore, suggested hospitalization for a 
few days for diagnostic studies to definitely ascertain 
whether or not the discs were ruptured a.nd to give him 
a better indication as to the prognosis. 
On Septt>mber 24 1062, Mr. Soliz was admitted to the 
L.D.S. Hospital, and on September 25, 1962, Dr. Bernson 
perfornwd a cPrvical discogram on him. He reported 
that in the performance of the discogram insufficient 
dyP was used between the 6th and 7th cervical vertebra 
and that bt>cause of this the doctor was under the impres-
sion at that time, that the disc between the 6th and 7th 
cervical vertebra was normal. Dr. Bernson did not state 
that insuf fiicent dye was used between the 5th and 6th 
vertebra in thP performance of the dicogram, but only 
between the 6th and 7th vertebra (Exhibit P-7). 
After the discogram was performed, and m con-
sideration of the clinical findings suggested by the 
confirmation of the cervical discogram, Dr. Bernson 
diagnosed :Mr. Soliz' injury, stating unequivocally that 
he had two ruptured cervical discs attributable to the 
injury of March 21, 1962. 
At the time of the trial, Mr. Soliz testified of the 
pain he suffered, the intensity and duration of it, the 
disability he suffered, and the continued treatment rP-
quired by him in an effort tn get rt>lief. In this regard 
he stated that following the accident and over the next 
month or so his baek, neek, arms and hands would ache 
4 
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and that he could hardly move them until he moved 
around for a while; that he was required to wear a 
plastic neck collar for from six to eight weeks; that dur-
ing thP disco.gram he was in terrific pain, was numb and 
thought he was paralyzed; that his condition failed to 
improve as of the date of trial, and that by reason of his 
injuries he was unable to report to work regularly to his 
Pmployment and lost 172 hours of time from work. He 
also testified that because he was unable to perform the 
cluti('s of his employment a change of job was necessary, 
duP to his injury and disability. 
Tn addition to the pain and suffering experienced by 
Mr. Soliz, in relation to disability, he stated that he 
\ms unable to walk as he did before the accident, was 
unable to sit for any period of time without becoming 
restless requiring him to get up and walk around, was 
nnabh• to drive his car for any long distances as he did 
prior to the accident, did not have the energy he had 
before the accident, his sleeping habits were different in 
that since the accident he could not sleep through the 
night, was unable to go to dances as he did before, unable 
to go camping and fishing as before, was unable to go 
on a planned vacation during the summer following the 
accident, was unable to do the normal yard wo·rk around 
his home as he did prior to the accident, the normal asso-
ciation which a father enjoys particularly with sons the 
ag·t• of the Soliz boys in that he was unable to play ball 
with them, go on canyon trips, take them to the gym, etc. 
The medical expenses incurred by Mr. Soliz for 
treatment of his injuries was $499.65 (Exhibt P-11); and 
5 
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the operation which Dr. Bernson said Mr. Soliz would 
need to remove the ruptured discs would coot between 
$800 and $1,050. 
This testimony of Mr. Soliz was also borne out at 
the trial by the testimony of his wife, who testified about 
the ·pain and disability of her husband from the time 
of the accident to the time of the trial. 
On September 11, 1963, at the request of Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, an independent medical examina-
tion of Mr. Soliz was performed by Dr. Reed S. Clegg, 
an orthopedic surgeon in Salt Lake City, Utah (Exhibit 
P-6). Dr. Clegg saw Mr. Soliz on one occasion only, at 
which time he had x-rays taken which he examined. 
However, he did not examine the x-rays taken by Dr. 
Winters or Dr. Benson (T-168 Soliz vs. Ammerman). At 
the time of this examination Mr. Soliz related his physi-
cal difficulties to Dr. Clegg, who located tenderness in 
the lower cervical and upper thoracic spine and in the 
lumbosacral region of his back. Pressure on these areas 
produced pain. Mr. Soliz also lacked 12 inches of touch-
ing the floor with his fingers while holding his knees 
extended. 
X-ray of the cervical spine showed bony irregularity 
about the fourth, fifth and sixth vertebra with some bone 
bridging anteriorly between the fourth and fifth verte-
bral bodies. There was also a small fleck of calcification 
posterior to the posterior spinous process of the fifth 
cervical vertebra. X-rays of the thoracic and lumbosac-
ral spine showed bony irregularity, calcium deposits and 
some osteoarthritic changes. 
6 
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After his examination Dr. Clegg diagnosed Mr. 
Soliz' injury as moderate, chronic osteoarthritis of the 
cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine. He also stated that 
the patient had somewhat more extensive bone and joint 
C'hanges than a man of thirty-nine years of age, but 
that these were within normal limits. The changes, Dr. 
Clegg said, represented degeneration, or wear and tear 
changes, and were not considered by him to be the result 
of a single accident, such as described as occurring on 
March 21, 1962 (Exhibit P-6, page 3). 
As part of its investigative program, Farmers In-
surance Exchange hired a private investigator to con-
duct an activity check on Mr. Soliz and report to them. 
'rhe activity check was conducted by a private investi-
gator, but he was not called to testify at the trial rela-
tive to the findings of his invesigation, nor was his report 
introduced into evidence (Exhibit P-1). The introduc-
ton of the report was never attempted or sought by the 
insurance company at the trial. 
On April 5, 1963, the insurance company's counsel 
wrote and sent to the company an "Opinion As to Lia-
bility" and "Recommendations As To Value And Settle-
ment" (Exhibit P-3). In that document the insurance 
company was advised that the attorney classified the 
case as one of liability. On the aspect of settlement 
value the attorney reviewed the report and findings of 
Dr. Bernson in relation to the ruptured discs. The com-
pany was advised at that time that if Mr. Soliz did not 
have a herniated disc the case had a settlement value of 
$3,500. If he did have a herniated disc the case was 
7 
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valued at $8,500. A settlement of $6,000 was recom-
mPnded at that time. 
On April 10, 1963, Mr. R. .T. Hadley, Branch Claim:-; 
~Ianager of Farmers Insurance Exchange, wrote a letter 
to its legal counsPl stating that "The facts indicate that 
we have very little to talk about liabiity-wise, however, 
the injuries }wing complained of need to be verified 
before WP arP ready to entPr into any negotiations for 
settlement." (Exhibit P-15). 
On May 29, 1 %3, an intPr-off ice memo from :\Ir. R 
.J. HadlPy, the Salt Lah Branch Claims Manager, to a 
:\fr. George S. Newberry, apparently the Regional Claims 
:\fanager, stated "In view of Dr. Bc>rnson's findings, it 
appears that we an' going to have a rather difficult 
time def ending this casP, if we do not come up some 
medical testimon)' which will refute his presPnt diag-
nosis." The memo further stated that the company 
had not been able to come up with any information indi-
cating that the injuries pre-existed the accident, and if 
Dr. Bernson's findings were confinned l\Ir. Hadley would 
place a value of $7,500 on tlw claim. At that time Mr. 
Hadley changed the company rpservPs to $5,000 on the 
claim. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #10 is a company inter-office 
correspondence document from Mr. Hadley to Mr. New-
berry, dated June 10, 1963. The rt>servPs are shown to 
be $5,000 on the claim of l\f r. Soliz, and a trial date of 
September 4, 1963. It also shows a demand of $9,000 
on the claim of Mr. Soliz aud indicates no offer had 
been made by the company. 
8 
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Prior to the time of the trial of the Soliz vs. Ammer-
111011 cmw plaintiff by and through his counsel communi-
eah·d an off Pr of sPttlPment of $9,000 to Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange (R-311, T-177). After the trial was over, 
hut hefore the jury returnPd its verdict, an off er of set-
tlement in the amount of $10,000 was made to the insur-
anee compnay (R-311, T-177). Both offers were rejected. 
'l'IH• highest offer of settlemPnt ever received by Mr. 
Soliz from the insurance company was the sum of $4-,500 
(H-1G5, T-28, R-311, T-177). 
At the trial of the instant case plaintiffs called two 
attornP)'S as expert witnesses in relation to the evalu-
ation of Mr. Soliz's claim, for settlement purposes, in 
tlH• Soliz vs. Ammerman case. The first attorney wit-
lless called by plaintiffs was L. E. Midgley, a Salt Lake 
attorn<')' with considerable insurance claims and insur-
ance def PnSP experience. He asserted that after receipt 
of Dr. Bernson's report, in his opinion, the claim had a 
reasonable sPttlement value of $7,500, and he would have 
iw~mmncmded settlement of the claim for that figure at 
that timP. He also testified that he would have recom-
mended the company pay $10,000, if necessary, to avoid 
trial (R-:238, T-10:3) .. Mr. l\lidgley testified that in this 
particular cas<' hP would have expected a jury verdict 
anywhPrP from $10,000 to $15,000 (R-239, T-10-1). 
ThP sPcond attorney expert witness called by plain-
tiffs ,rns Tel Charlier, of Salt Lake City, and a partner 
in the law firm that rPprPsented plaintiff Eddie Soliz 
in the Soliz vs. Aumwnnan acton and the instant case. 
l\fr. Charier is also an attornPy with eonsiderable insur-
9 
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ance claims and personal injury trial defense experience 
(R-269-273, T-134-139). After acquainting himself with 
all the aspects of this case, Mr. Charlier made an evalu-
ation of claim just before trial. In his opinion the case 
had a settlement value at that time of bebveen $10,000 
and $12,000 (R-309, T-175). 
Defendant called two expert attorney witnesses to 
testify relative. to the evaluation of the claim. They were 
~Ir. Gordon R. Strong and Mr. Harold Christensen, both 
Salt Lake City attorneys specializing in personal injury 
defense for insurance companies. Mr. Strong stated that, 
in his opinion, if the jury believed Dr. Bernson's testi-
mony and report in its entirety he would have antici-
pated a verdict of a.bout $7,500 (R-282, T-147). If the 
jury believed Dr. ·Clegg's testimony and report in its 
entirety he would have anticipated a verdict of around 
$2,000 to $2,500 (R-283, T-148). However, it was his 
opinion that the jury \vould not believe either doctor en-
tirely, and on that basis said he would have anticipated 
a verdict of around $5,000 to $6,000; and before trying 
the case he would have attempted to settle it in the area 
of $5,000 to $6,000 (R-283, T-148). l\Ir. Christensen testi-
fied that after he had read the reports of Drs. Bernson 
and Clegg and read Mr. Soliz' deposition, he evaluated 
plaintiff's claim at between $6,000 and $7,500 (R-331-332, 
T-179-180). 
After hearing all of the testimony from all the wit-
nesses in the Soliz vs. Ammerman case, the jury returned 
a verdict in favor of l\Ir. Soliz and against Mr. Ammer-
man for the sum of $15,HG.2G, plus court costs of $76.00 
10 
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(H-2). The policy limits of $10,000 was eventually paid 
on the judgment by Farmers Insurance Exchange. Upon 
the refu~al of the company to pay the judgment in excess 
of the policy limits plaintiffs filed this action to compel 
payme-nt of that amount. At the conclusion of the evi-
dence defendant made a motion for a directed verdict, 
which the Court denied. A special verdict was sub-
mitted to which was answered as follows: 
In refusing to settle the Soliz-Ammerman case, 
did this defendant act in bad faith in either of the 
following particulars? 
(a) Prior to trial when it could have settled 
the case for $9,000? 
Answer Yes. 
( b) At the trial and before the verdict was 
returned by the jury when it could have 
settled the case for $10,000? 
Answer Yes. (R-120) 
Dt>fendant's subsequent motions for a new trial and 
for judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict were also 
denied hy the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER 
COURT ARE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT BY THE RE-
VIEWING COURT ON APPEAL. 
The cases are legion supporting the general propo-
sition of law stated in Point I, and especially as it 
applies to the instant case. No cases have been found by 
n•spondent stating a contrary position. 
11 
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Not only is thpre a prl'Sumption of validity on ap-
peal of the judgment and proceedings in the lower court, 
but the burden is on the appellant affirmatively to dPrn-
onstrate error, and in thE~ absence of such the judgment 
must be affirmed by the reviewing court. Leithead vs. 
'Adair, 10 U.2d 282, 351 P.2d 956; Coombs vs. Perry, 2 
LT.2d 381, 275 P.2d 680. Again, on appeal the judgment 
of the trial court is pre~mmptively correct and every rea-
sonable intendment must be indulged in by the appellate 
court in favor of it. Burton vs. Zions Co-operative Mer-
ca11tilc Instit11tion, 122 li.360, 249 P.2d 514; Nagle vs. 
Club FontainlJlcu, 17 U.2d 125, 405 P.2d 346; Petty vs. 
Gindy Man11far:i1tri11g Corporation, 17 U.2d 32, +04 P.2d 
30. 
This proposition of law is correct and is binding 
upon the appellate court whether the proceedings in the 
lower court are bPfore a judge only or a judge and jury. 
And thP rulp seems to have even more weight in the 
latter instanee. When the trial court has given its ap-
proval to the detPrmination by the jury by refusing to 
grant a nPw trial to the losing party, the appellate court 
will look upon the judgment of the trial court with some 
degree of verity with a presumption in favor of its va-
lidity, and again the burden is upon the appellant to 
show souw rwrsuasive reason for upsPtting it. Gordon vs. 
Prom City, 15 U.2d 287, :391 P.2d -±30. In the same vein, 
it has been held that whPre a jury trial has been had 
and a motion for a npw trial deniPd to the losing party, 
the presumption:-; arP in favor of the judgment entered 
and the SupremP Court will not (listnrh that judgment 
unlPss the appellant llll'ets the lmrden of showing Prror 
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and prejudice which deprived it of a fair trial. Lemmon 
ns. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 
9 U.2d 195, 341 P.2d 215. 
Otlwr cases supporting this proposition are Charlton 
rs. Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176; Universal Invest-
ment Company vs. Carpets, Inc., 16 U.2d 336, 400 P.2d 
564; Taylor vs.Johnson, 15 U.2d 342, 389 P.2d 382; Wen-
del/we rs. Jacobson, 10 U.2d 344, 353 P.2d 178; Hadley 
rs. Wood, 9 U.2d 366, 345 P.2d 197; Daisy Distributors, 
I11c. vs. Local Union 976, Joint Cowncil 67, Western Con-
ference of Teamsters, 8 U.2d 124, 329 P.2d 414. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Tlw direction of a verdict in favor of one of the 
1iarties hy the trial court is proper only in the absence 
of any question of fact or when required by law. In this 
regard, a verdict should be directed only where, by giving 
the party against whom it is directed the benefit of the 
most favorable vie\Y of the evidence, the verdict against 
him is demanded. 53 Am. Jnr., Trial Section 357 et seq. 
Tlwre is no question that the good or bad faith of an 
imrnranrP carrier is a question for determination by the 
jury. See Southern Fre & Casnalty Company t'S. Norris, 
35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1951). Certainly in 
thP instant case reasonable minds could have differed on 
thP question of defendant's good faith from the evidence 
JH'PS<'nted and, accordingly, the trial court properly re-
fused to direct a v<>rdict in favor of the insurance com-
pany and against plaintiffs. 
13 
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Jn submitting tlw ease to the jury the trial comt 
instructed th"' jurors in Instruction #12: 
. . . The only issue before you in this case is 
whether or not the Farmers Insurance Exchange 
is liable to the plaintiffs for that amount by which 
the judgment in the action brought by Eddie Soliz 
and ~~dward Wilson Ammerman exceeds the cov-
erage provided in the policy of defendant, Farnt-
ers Insurance Exchange, by reason of the fact that 
the defendant was guilty of bad faith, in that it 
failed to settle the Soliz claim prior to trial when 
it could have setted for $9,000 or, when that offer 
was withdrawn at trial, it failed to settle before 
the jury returned the verdict, for $10,000 (R-100, 
101). 
In relation to bad faith, Instruction #11 advised the jury: 
"Bad faith" as used herein means the opposite 
of good faith, generally implying or involving ae-
tual or constructive fraud or a design to mislead 
or deceive another or a neglect or refusal to fulfil 
some duty or some contractual obligation not 
prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights 
or duties, but by some interested or sinister mo-
tive (R-99). 
r nstruction #f) is as follmvs: 
You should not ignore or disregard the testimony 
of any witness, whether for the plaintiff or for 
thP defendant, or whether or not such witness 
is a party to the action or is interested in the 
result thereof, simply because of such fact; but 
you may take all the facts into consideration in 
detennining the credibility of any witness. The 
testimony of each witness should be considered 
fairly an<l impartially an<l he given such weight 
and pffect as you think it is entitled to, measured 
hy reason and common sense and the standards 
given you in these instructions for determining 
14 
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tlw weight and credibility of witnesses generally 
(H-9G). 
It is true that m the majority of the cases which 
havP passed upon the q1w:-1tion, the courts havP held that 
a liahilit~· insurPr, having assumed control of the right 
of settlPment of clai1m; against the insured, may become 
liable in excess of its undertaking under the policy pro-
visions if it fails to Pxercise "good faith" in considering 
offrrs to compromise the claim within the policy limits. 
f-i<'P -Hl A.L.R.2d l 78 and the cases cited there. A large 
nmnlwr of jurisdictions have held that there may be Jia-
hilit~' on the part of the insurPr for negligence in reject-
ing a reasonable cornpromisP offer. Id. at 186. While 
there are many courts and decisions that agree that the 
inl"nn'r must exercise good faith toward the insured 
in rPlation to suits filed against it and settlement thereof, 
tlwre is disagreement as to just what degree of con-
sidPration for the insured 's interest is involved in the 
"good-faith concept." However, probably all jurisdic-
tions accept the rule that the insurer is bound to give 
some consideration to the insured's interests. 40 A.L.R. 
2d 1'71. 
TherP is also little question that negligence is an ele-
ment to be considerPd in ascertaining bad faith. 
l'nder Point I of its brief appellant asserts at page 
7 thereof that in the case of Brown vs. Guarantee Insur-
aw·e Company, 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 Pac. 2d 69 
( 1958) thP court summed up from cases on bad faith and 
laid drl\\'n seven factors as constituent parts of bad 
faith, viz: 
15 
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1. AttPmpts hy the insurer to get the insured 
to contribute to settlenwnt. 
:2. Failure of the insurt>r to investigate the 
case sufficiently to ascertain the evidence agairn;t 
the insured. 
3. Rejection by the insurer of its agent's or 
attorney's advice. 
+. Failure of the insurer to inform the in-
sured of the settlement offers. 
5. Participation by the insured by acquies-
cing in the insurer's conduct of the defense, or 
misleading the insurer as to the facts. 
6. The amount of financial risk earh party 
is exposed to. 
7. The strength of the respective sides as to 
liability and damages. 
RespondPnts respectfully assert that the Brown case 
does not hold that these elements are necessary con-
curring constituent elements of bad faith, nor is it the 
law that they are. See -t-0 A.L.R.2d 171. When it comes 
to the question of what particular acts, conduct, or cir-
cmnstances are sufficient to charge the insurer with lia-
bility for its failure to settle a claim within the policy 
limits, the courts have found or sustained findings of 
bad faith on any one of the dt'ments stated and on other 
elements or bases not included in this list, and have not 
demandt'd the presence of all seven t'lements in one case. 
As a mattt'r of fact, it is not necessary that any one of 
the elt'rnents listed b0 prt>sent in order to support a 
finding of bad faith on thP part of the insurer, so long 
as ther(~ arc> facts upon which a Jury can reasonably 
make a finding of bad faith. 
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In an attempt to formulate a satisfactory test as to 
what degree of consideration for the insured's interest 
is entailed in the exercise of good faith, (1) some courts 
have indicated that in the absence of actual fraud or 
misrepresentation the insurer is entitled to regard its 
own interest as paramount, (2) other courts have said 
that the interest of the insured must be given equal con-
sideration, (3) and at least one court has taken the posi-
tion that in the event of a conflict of interest the insured's 
interest must be given priority. 40 A.L.R.2d 181 et. Seq. 
The rule as to good faith was stated by the court 
in National Mutual Casualty Company vs. Britt, 203 Okla. 
175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948) to the effect that in consider-
ing an off er of settlement, the insurer was bound to 
give the rights of the insured at least as much consider-
ation as it did its own in determining whether or not 
to effect a settlement. 
In the case of Amercan Fidelity & Casualty Com-
pany vs. G. A. Nichols Companys, (1949, C.A. 10th Okla.) 
173 F.2d 830, the court said that a liability insurance 
company having an irrevocable power to determine 
whether an offer of compromise of a claim should be 
accepted or rejected is in a fiduciary relationship with 
the insured and owes the duty of exercising the utmost 
good faith toward the insured, and while it may profit-
ably give consideration to its own interest in considering 
a compromse offer, it must, in good faith, give at least 
equal consideration to the interest of the insured. To the 
the same effect is American Fidelity & Casualty Company 
vs. American Bus Lines, Inc., (1951), C.A. 10th Okla.) 
19 F.2d 234, cert den 342 U.S 851, 96 L.Ed.642, 72 S.Ct. 79. 
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Southern Fire & Casu.alty Compamy L's Norris, :-l5 
Tenn. A pp. 657, 250 S. W .2d 785 ( 1951) is to the effed 
that while an insurer is under no duty to comprornisP 
a claim for the sole benefit of its insured if to continrn• 
the fight offers a fair and reasonable prospect of escap-
ing liability or of getting off for less than the policy 
limit, thf' insured also has a right to assume that hi1' 
interest will not be abandoned merely becausP the in-
surer faces tlw prospect of a full loss, the relation be-
tween the insurer and the insured being one of trust 
calling for reciprocity of action, and if the proof, in the 
light of all the relevant circumstances and inferences, 
is such as to eave a reasonable basis for disagreement 
among reasonable minds, the question of good faith is 
for the jury. 
In Tiger River Pipe Company vs. Maryland C<is-
u.alty Company, 163 S.C. 229, 161 S.E. 491 (1931) the 
trial court sustained, as against a demurrer, a complaint 
charging the defendant insurer with both negligence and 
bad faith in rejecting a compromise off er within the 
policy limits. On a latter appeal Tiger River Pipe Com-
pany vs. Maryland Casualty Company, 170 S.C. 286, 170 
S.E. 346, a verdict for the insured was sustained, the 
court apparently holding that there was evidence to go 
to the jury on both the issues of negligence and bad 
faith, but expressly stating that the jury had found the 
defendant insurer guilty of bad faith. The court re-
jected the contention that in considering a compromise 
offer, the insurer was entitled to look at its own interests 
as well as those of thf' insurf'd, stating that if the in-
surer's interests eonflided with those of the insured, it 
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was bound, under the standard of good faith, to sacrifice 
itR interpsts in favor of the insured. To adopt any other 
rnle would make a policy of indemnity a delusion and a 
snare, said the court, since in the nature of things when 
there was a conflict of interest, as was inevitable under 
the circumstances, the company would always give pref-
<'rencP to its own, and put the insured into the position 
of "Heads I win, tails you lose." 
Although negligence is not the sole basis in deter-
mining the good or bad faith by the insurer it is ce1·-
tainly a relevant consideration, and in several instances 
"good faith'' and negligence appear to have been sub-
stantially equated. See 40 A.L.R.2d 183. Traders & Gen-
('rfll Ins111rance Company vs. Rudco Oil & Gas Company, 
( 1942, C. A. 10th Okla.) 129 F.2d 621, 142 A.L.R. 799, 
Rtates the rule that the insured is under a duty to exer-
eise good faith in considering an offer of compromise 
and its duty under the circumstances includes the obli-
gation of exercising diligence and intelligence. To the 
same eff Pct is Royal Transit vs. Central Surety & Insur-
ance Corporation, (1948, C. A. 7th Wis.) 168 F.2d 345, 
e<'rt den 335 V.8. 844, 93 L.Ed. 395, 69 S.Ct. 68, Bartlett 
11s. Trai"Plers' Insurance Company, 117 Conn. 147, 167 
A. 180 (1933). 
In A utomolJile Mutual Indemnity Company vs. Sha.w, 
1:34 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 ( 1938) the court stated that the 
insurt>r in tht> settlement of claims should be held to 
that degree of can' and diligence which a man of ordi-
nary care and prudence should exercist' in the manage-
ment of his own businesR. No evidence of bad faith on 
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the part of the insurer was proven here and the judgment 
was reversed in this action. 
Lawson & Nelson S & D Company vs. Associated 
lndemndy Corporation, 204 Minn. 50, 282 N.W. 481 
(1938) applying the "good-faith" test of the insurer's 
liability took the vein that the test involves the applica-
tion of the standard of due care and the exercise of 
honest judgment. Mendota Electrical Company vs. New 
York Indemnity Company, 169 Minn. 377, 211 N.W. 317 
(192G) later appealed 175 Minn. 181, 221 N.W. 61 (upon 
reasonable grounds for the belief that the amount re-
quired to effect a settlement is excessive), Hart vs. Re-
public 1vlutua,Z Insurance Compa.ny, (1949) 152 Ohio St. 
185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (reasonable jusification); Bolenz vs. 
New Amsterdam Casnalty Company, (1935) 173 Okla. 
60, 46 P.2d 916 (skill, care, and good faith); Southern 
Fire & Casualty Compa·ny vs. Norris Ibid (good faith and 
diligence); .J. Spong Baking Company vs. Trinity Uni-
versal Insurance Company, (1946, App.) 45 Ohio L. Abs. 
577, 68 N.E.2d 122 (to act fairly and exercise reasonable 
care). 
In applying the negligence standard the courts have 
ordinarily held that the degree of care required by the 
insurance company is that which an ordinarily prudent 
person would exercise> in the conduct of his own affairs, 
and that the standard is an external one, Dumas vs. Hart-
ford Accident & hidcmnity Company, (1947) 94 N.H. 
484, 56 A.2d 57; Wilson rs. Aetna Casiwlty & Siirety 
Company, (1950) 1-15 "Me. 370, 76A.2d111; G. A. Stowers 
Furnititre Company r;;. American Indemnity Company, 
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(1929, Tex. Com. App.) 15 S.W.2d 5-±4, 29 N.C.C.A. 140; 
Highway Insurance Underwriters vs. Litfken-Beaumont 
Motor Coaches, (1948, Tex. Civ. App. 215 S.W.2d 904; 
Jones vs. Highway Inswrance Underwriters, (1952, Tex. 
Civ. App.) 253 S.W.2d 1018. 
The weight of the evidence against the insured on 
the issues of damages and liability is relevant in deter-
mining whether the insurer should have compromised 
the claim, hence, it has frequently been recognized that 
the fact that the claimant had a strong case against 
the insured on both the issues of liability and damages 
has some tendency to show that the insurer's rejection 
of the offer was in bad faith. See 40 A.L.R. 196 et Seq. 
and the cases there cited. 
An application of the pertinent facts of the instant 
ease shows that the jury could reasonably have found 
that Farmers Insurance Company did not act in good 
faith in not settling Mr. Soliz' claim within the policy 
limits when it had an opportunty to do so before the 
jury returned its verdict in the Soliz vs. Ammerman case. 
The company knew that the claimant had a strong 
case against its insured, for its attorney classified the 
case as one of liability (Exhibit P-3) and the company 
stated in a letter to its attorney that "We have very little 
to talk about liability-wise" (Exhibit P-15). In fact, 
upon completion of the trial of the Soliz vs. Ammerman 
case, in the judge's chambers and prior to the instructions 
to the jury, the attorney for l\Ir. Soliz made two motions, 
together and in the alternative (T-233 Soliz vs. Ammer-
man). The first motion \ms that the court direct aver-
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diet in favor of Soliz and against defendant Ammerman 
on the ground that Mr. Ammerman was negligent and 
that his negligence was the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. The second motion, in the alternative, was that 
the cow't find as a matter of law that defendant Am-
merman was negligent as a matter of law and that such 
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident In 
response to the motions counsel for the Insurance com-
pany representing l\lr. Ammerman stated (T-234 Soliz 
vs. Ammerman): 
I \\'Ould consent to the granting of the alternative 
motion, that the court might find as a matter of 
law that the defendant was guilty of negligence 
in making a left hand turn and leave the issue 
of contributory negligence on the part of Mr. 
Soliz to the jury. 
Liability then being heavily weighted against Mr. Am-
merman, as the company well knew, the only question 
was the rangl~ within which the jury verdict in favor of 
l\f r. Soliz for is personal injuries could be reasonably 
anticipated. 
In that regard the testimony of Mr. Soliz and his 
wife, relative to his condition prior to the accident, the 
pain, suffering and disability after the accident and right 
up to the time of trial, are extremely signifcant. Coupled 
with this is the testimony of Dr. Bernson, who had ex-
amined Mr. Soliz on at least four occasions over a period 
of about six months, wherein he said that he could state 
unequivocally (emphasis added) that Mr. Soliz had two 
ruptured cervical discs which 'vere caused by the acci-
dent of March 21, 1962. He was also definite in his opin-
ion that l\fr. Soliz would evmtually require definitive 
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treatment to repair the condition, as the disc and liga-
nwntous structure involved are rarely, i:f ever, capable 
of healing, and as time went on the discs would degener-
ate, resulting in the production of more aggravating 
symptoms (Exhibit P-7). 
Dr. Clegg, the physician for Farmers Insurance Ex-
change, examined Mr. Soliz on one occasion. He was 
not unequivocal in his position as to Mr. Soliz' injury, 
hut stated that there was a degenerative change in the 
complete spine which could not be attributable to the 
single accident of March 21, 1966. Dr. Clegg did not 
state unequivocably that Mr. Soliz did not have two rup-
tured discs from the accident, nor did he state at all 
that some part of the condition of Mr. Soliz' spine was 
not caused by the accident. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange was well aware of 
the seriousness of Mr. Soliz' injuries. After having re-
ceived Dr. Bernson's report, the Company Branch Claims 
.Man ager advised the Regional Office: 
In view of Dr. Bernson's findings, it appears that 
we are going to have a rather difficult time de-
f ending this case, if we do not come up with some 
medical testimony which will refiite (emphasis 
added) his present diagnosis. 
Appellants submit that the testimony of Dr. Clegg did 
not refute the diagnosis of Dr. Bernson, nor was it likely 
to do so in view of the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Soliz 
and the unequivocal diagnosis of Dr. Bernson. 
Reed Richards, personal attorney for Mr. Anuner-
man, realized that liability on the part of the insured 
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was clear, that Mr. Soliz' injury was substantial, and 
the great risk of a judgment in excess of $10,000. His 
letter to the company of September 27, 1962, transmit-
ting the summons and complaint to it indicated that (Ex-
hibit P-4); and on September 16, 1963, shortly before the 
trial, on behalf of Mr. Ammerman, he made demand upon 
the insurance company and its attorneys to settle the 
claim of Mr. Soliz for a figure within the limits of the 
insurance policy. His demand went unheeded, and was 
refused by the company, to Mr. Ammerman's detriment. 
Closely associated with the information discussed, 
the company had, for its benefit, a report on activity 
check which it had arranged to have made on Mr. Soliz 
in an effort to determine the extent of his disability and 
injury (Exhibt P-1). It can only be inferred that the 
information from this check was disastrous, or at least 
very unhelpful to the insurance company's position, be-
cause the investigator conducting the surveillance of Mr. 
Soliz "·as never called to testify at the trial, nor was 
the introduction of his report into evidence attempted. 
At the trial of the instant matter the insurance company 
did not produce the report. 'The jury in this case, of 
course, were aware of this development, and apparently 
drew their own inferences therefrom. 
Of the insurance company's two expert attorney 
witnesses, one said that he would have anticipated a ver-
dict of about $7,500 if Dr. Bernson were believed, and 
$2,000-$2,500 if Dr. Clegg were believed, but that he 
would have attempted to settle the case for between 
$5,000 and $6,000. The other expert attorney witness 
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testified that, in his opinion, the claim of Mr. Soliz was 
worth between $6,000 and $7,500. 
The attorney representing Fanners Insurance Ex-
change prior to trial advised the company that if Mr. 
Soliz had a herniated disc he valued the claim at $8,500, 
and if he didn't have a herniated disc it was worth $3,500 
and a settlement of $6,000 was recommended by the 
eounsel. 
It is further interesting to note that the company 
placed a value of $7,500 on the claim and placed a re-
serve of $5,000 on it, showing that the company was 
placing a reserve on the claim considerably lower than 
its actual value. 
In view of all the evidence produced by the insur-
ance company at the trial of the instant matter, and in 
reviewing the evidence most favorable to it, respondents 
are of the opinion that the bad faith of the company in 
the handling of this claim is an1ply demonstrated. Only 
one offer of settlement was made by the company, and 
that was for the sum of $4,500 - a figure $3,000 lower 
than it thought the case was actually worth, and $500 
below its own reserve figure. It is only $1,000 higher 
than the value of the casE~ placed on it by the company 
attorney if Dr. Clegg was believed in his entirety and 
Dr. Bernson, 1\Ir. Soliz and Mrs. Soliz were disbelieved, 
whirh would be a highly unlikely occurrence. The one 
:-wttlPment offrr made by the insurance company was 
also from $500 to $3,000 10\nr than its own expert wit-
1wsses tPstified tlw easP was worth and what they would 
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have offered to settk• the elairn rather than risk a laro-er 
b 
verdiet at a trial of the case. 
Considering tlH· eonduct of the company as above 
stated, coupled with the fact that it had two opportuni-
ties to settle the case within the policy limits before the 
jury returned its verdict - one of which offers was only 
$500 above the evaluation figure placed on the claim by 
the company attorney if Dr. Bernson was believed -
the bad faith of the insurance company is manifest. Both 
expert attorney witnesses called by plaintiff placed a 
settlement value figure on the claim of at least $10,000, 
and stated they would have paid the policy limits rather 
than try the case. One of the witnesses evaluated the 
claim at between $10,000-$12,000 before trial, and the 
other said he would have anticipated a verdict of around 
$15,000 if the case was tried to a jury. He stated that 
before the trial he would have offered to settle the case 
for $7,000, but stated that was a "horse-trading" figure. 
As trial approached he would have paid the policy limits 
rather than try the case. 
In discussing the $15,000 verdict of the jury, which 
the insurance company claimed was given under pas-
sion and prejudice, the Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Soliz vs. Ammerman, 16 U.2d 11, 15, 395 P.2d 25 (1964): 
Although the verdict of $15,000 general damages 
is substantial, we find nothing to indicate passion 
or prejudice in view of the evidence of the pains, 
suffering, recommendations by plaintiff's doct~rs 
to remove injured discs, and the very definite 
claims of plaintiff that he did suffer great pains. 
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B.l:'spondents feel that, in vww of all the faets in-
volved in this matter, Farmers Insurance Exchange could 
have rl:'asonably anticipatl:'d and l:'Xpected that the jury 
might believe plaintiff, plaintiff's wife and Dr. Bernson, 
disregard the testimony of Dr. Cll:'gg and return a ver-
dict in favor or l\fr. Soliz and against Mr. Ammerman 
for a sum in excess of the policy limits. And as stated 
by the Utah Supreme Court, a judgment of $15,000 was 
for a reasonable amount considering the evidence of the 
case. 
Following is a representative sampling of the num-
erous cases where the amounts involved as to policy 
coverage, available compromise, and final judgment were 
as stated, and where it was held that a liability insurer 
was, or could properly be held, liable for wrongful re-
jection of the compromise off er: 
Aniericam Mut. Liabiity Ins. Co. v. Cooper (1932) 
CA5th Ala.) 61 F.2d 446, cert den 289 U.S. 736, 
77 L.ed. 1-1-83, 53 S.Ct. 595 - policy limits $5,000, 
settlement offers of $3,000, $4,000, and $4,500, 
final judgment $13,500. 
Nohsey v. Amerioan Auto. Ins. Co. (1934, CAGth 
Tl:'nn.) 68 F.2d 808 - policy limit of $10,000, ac-
tion for $40,000, settlement offers of $12,500 and 
$10,000 rejected, judgment for $22,500. 
Maryland Cas. Co. i;. Cook-O'Brien Constr. Co. 
(1934 CA8th Mo.) 69 B'.2d 462, cert den 293 U.S. 
569, 79 L.cd. 668, 55 S.Ct. 81 - policy limits of 
$5,000, action for $200,000, initial compromise of-
f er of $3,500 rejected, as was subsequent compro-
mise off er of $6,500, made after injured employee 
had secured verdict for $13,000 on first trial, final 
recovery in excess of $12,000. 
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Maryland Casualty Co. v. Elmira Coal Co. (1934, 
CA8th l\Io.) o9 .F'.2d 6H:i - policy limits of $5,000, 
offers of settlement of $360 and $1,000, ultimate 
judgment for $10,000. 
Brown & McCabe, Stevedores v. London Guaram-
tee & Acci. Co. (1915, DC Or) 232 .F'.298 - $5,000 
policy, offt>r of settlement for $3,000, $12,000 judg-
ment recovered. 
Olympia Fiel.ds Country Club vs. Bankers Indem. 
Ins. Co. (1945) 325 Ill. App. 649 60 N.E.2d 896 -
policy limits $10,000, action for $50,000, compro-
mise off er of $3,500 before trial, and of $8,000 
after trial verdict for $20,000 was obtained, final 
judgment for $20,000. 
Ballard v. Citizens Casnalty Co. (1952, CA7th Ill) 
19G .F'.2d 96 - policy limit of $2,500, action for 
50,000, compromise offers of $2,500 and $2,000, 
final judgment for $G,500. 
llfcCom/;s v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1935) 231 
l\Io. App. 1206 89S.W.2d114-policy limits $5,000, 
off er of settlement for $5,000, verdict for $18,000, 
reduced on remittur to $13000, finally settled for 
$10,000. 
Douglas v. United States Fidelity & G. Co. (1924) 
81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 709, 37 A.L.R. 1477 - policy 
limits $5,000, off er to settle for $1,500, final judg-
ment for $13,500. 
G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. 
Co. (1929, Tex. Com. App.) 15 SW.2d 544, 29 
N.C.C.A 140 - $5,000 policy coverage, action for 
$20,000, off er to settle for $4,000, final judgment 
for $14,000. 
ReRpondents submit that by the application of the 
"good-faith'' rule or the negligence rule the insurance 
company is found wainting in its conduct, as the jury 
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found it was, and that it is liable for the full amount of 
thP judgment rendered against its insured. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
INTO EVIDENCE, OVER THE OBJECTION OF DEFEND-
ANT, THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DEFENDANT 
AND ITS ATTORNEY. 
At the trial of the instant case, plaintiffs in that 
matter, respondents herein, served a subpoena duces 
tecurn on the insurance company and the counsel for the 
insurance company, ordering them to appear in court 
and bring at that time their files and correspondence 
relating to the Soliz vs. Ammerman case. Counsel for 
the insurance company objected to the use of that ma-
terial in the instant case on the ground that its recom-
mendations to the company were confidential and privi-
leged. The trial court overruled the objection, stating 
that the company counsel's evaluation and recommenda-
tion relating to the Soliz claim was material and not 
confidential in this case, because the evaluation, recom-
nwndations and opinion of counsel to the insurance 
company goes to the question of the latter's good or bad 
faith (R-146-147). In the opinion of respondents the rul-
ing of the trial court was correct. 
The so-called attorney-client privilege found in 78-
24-8 ( 2) U.C.A. 1953, and referred to by the insurance 
company in its brief, is not, nor is it intended to be, an 
absolute privilege any more than the so-called hu:sband-
wif e privilege, 78-24-8 (1) U.C.A., 1953, is intended to be. 
There is an exception to the attorney-client privilege 
rule where the application of the privilege rule by ex-
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eluding confidential ('Omrnunications between the attor-
ney anrl client would be injurious to the attorney's 
intP·rests. In this regard, the rulP as to the privilege 
has no application where the client in an action against 
the attorney charges negligence or malpractice. 58 Am. 
itr., Witnesses, Section 514, p. 287-288 and the cases there 
cited. The privilege is that of the client, not the attorney, 
and is to be claimed or waived by it if it is not a party 
in court. In this case, of course, the insurance company 
was a party to the action. Nor can the communications 
betwt-en the insurance company and its counsel relating 
to the lattt-r's evaluation of tlw case, opinions and advise 
bi• construed to he the work product of the attorney under 
the provisions of Rule 30(b) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
ct-dnre. 
Graben vs. Travelers Indemnity Company, 266 
N.Y.S.2d 616 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1965) was an action by the 
plaintiff against the insurer for bad faith on the part 
of the insurance company for its refusal to settle a claim 
whNein the discovery was sought of the insurance com-
pany's file, including the reserve established by it and 
the corrt-spondence between the company and the State 
Irnmrance Department in respect to the reserve. The 
eourt held that the produetion of the file was not pre-
cluded by the "work-produet" rule or the "attorney-client 
privilege" rule. 
With respect to the rest-rve and correspondence by 
tht• insurance company and the State Department of 
Insurance in respeet to it, the court stated: 
Presumably, these items could be material and 
necessary to the action as an admission against 
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interest as to defendant's knowledge and evalu-
ation of the case. It can be argued that this was 
an internal matter of the insurer not related to 
the preparation of hte legal defense of the actions. 
However, examvnation with respect to the reserve 
may develop evidence on the issue of defendant's 
bod faith. (Emphasis added) 
Bad faith is a state of mind which must be es-
tablished by circumstantial evidence. The actions 
of defendant in respect to the reserve are rele-
vant. Negligent investigation and uniformed 
evaluation of the worth of the Rosen claims goes 
to the heart of the case since serious and recurring 
negligence can be indicative of bad faith. Defen-
dant's actions on the reserve may have a direct 
bearing on the issue. 
Colbert vs. Home Indemnity Company, 259 N.Y.S. 
2d 36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) was also an action against 
an insurance company for its bad faith refusal to settle 
a claim for a reasonable amount. Plaintiff sought dis-
covery of the insurance company's files. The court held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to discover the company's 
files, but only as to documents specifically designated by 
plaintiff. Production of the insurer's files was not pre-
cluded either by the "work-product" rule or the "attor-
ney-client" privilege. 
Chitty vs. State Farm Midu.al Automobile lnsur.amce 
Company, 36 F.R.D. 37 (Ed. S.C. 1964) was an action 
hy the insured against his insurer for negligence and bad 
faith in failing to settle a claim against him. The court 
indicated that the plaintiff-insured was entitled to in-
spect the documents and records in the defendant-insur-
er's files in order to determine what investigation the 
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company made of this case, whether it rejected advice 
and reconunendations of its own agents, adjusters and 
attorneys. Production of the insurer's files was not 
precluded either by the "attorney-client" privilege or the 
"work-product" rule. 
Other than the cases cited herein, respondent has 
been unable to locate any others relating to this question. 
Respondent respectfully asserts that the cases cited 
by appellant in its brief on this question are either not 
contrary to the position taken by the courts in the cases 
cited herein, or are not applicable. Farm Bureau Midual 
Insurance Company vs. Anderson, 360 S.W.2d 314 (Mis-
souri, 1962) supports respondent's position, for that case 
states that communications between the insurance com-
pany's branch manager and its attorney, relating to 
contemplated litigation, was not privileged if the com-
munication took place in the ordinary course of business. 
I~ the instant case the communications between Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange and its attorneys took place 
in the ordinary course of business, since the communi-
cation dealt with the evaluation of the claim and opin-
ions as to liability thereon. The selling of automobile 
liability insurance, adjustment of claims against its in-
sured, evaluation and payment of claims, and defense 
of other claims are in the ordinary course of business 
of Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
The cases of Meleo System vs. Receivers of Trans-
america Insnrancc Company, 105 So. 2d 43 (Alabama, 
1958); Continental Casualty Company vs. Pogorzelski, 
82 N.,Y.2d 183 (Wisconsin, 1957); General Accident Fire 
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wnd Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. vs. Mitchell, 259 Pac. 2d 
SG2 (Colorado, 1953) and Emerson vs. Western Auto-
mobile Indemnity Association, 182 Pac. 647 (Kansas, 
1919) are not in point, since none of those cases involve 
actions against the insurance company by the insured, 
or a judgment creditor of the insured, where the negli-
gence or bad faith of the company is an issue. 
Inasmuch as the good or bad faith of appellant, 
Fanners Insurance Exchange, for failure to evaluate 
and settle the claim against Mr. Ammerman, its insured, 
was a vital issue in the case on appeal herein, the com-
munications between the company and its attorney were 
not privileged and the trial court properly ordered pro-
duction of the documents and their use as evidence in 
the trial. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF SOLIZ FROM THIS ACTION. 
The policy of insurance issued by Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange to Edward vV. Amerman contains the 
following provision: 
CONDITIONS 
( 6) Action Against the Company 
... As respects the insurance afforded under 
Coverages A and B, whenever judgment is 
secured against the insured or the executor 
or administrator of a deceased insured in an 
action based upon bodily injury, death, or 
property damage, then an action may be 
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brought against the Company on the policy 
and subject to ih; terms and limitations, by 
such judgment creditor to recover on the 
judgment . . . (R-55). 
Coverages A and B under this policy relate to claims 
against the insured for bodily injury and property dam-
age. 
It 1s obvious that tlw prov1s10n of the insurance 
policy issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange referred 
to permits actions hy a judgment creditor of the insured 
against the company. The judgment creditor of the in-
sured, in this case J\Ir. Soliz, is a third party beneficiary 
of thP contract entered into between the insurance com-
pany and Mr. Amnwrman, and his right to bring a direct 
action against Farmers Insurance Exchange arises out 
of a contractual provision and not an assignment of a 
claim by the insured nor a statutory provision. The fact, 
then, that tort claims are unassignahle in Utah, as claimed 
by appellant, is completely irrelevant and has nothing 
to do with resolving the question before the Court. 
It has been generally held by courts deciding the 
question that an injured third party pressing a claim 
against an insured has a right to recover against the 
latters liability insurance carrier for its bad faith or 
negligent failure to accept a reasonable compromise offer 
if the policy of insurance contains a provision permit-
ting him to do so, or giving him the same rights against 
the insurer enjoyed by the insured. Statutes giving the 
third party claimant this right or a provision in the 
insuranee policy to that effect ereates a contractual re-
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laton which inures to the benefit of any and every person 
who may be negligently injured by the insured, as com-
pletely as if such injured person were specifically named 
in the policy. See 29A Am. Jur. Insurance, Sec. 1486 and 
the cases there cited. And as to the extent of the re-
covery of an injured person under the so-called direct 
action against the company provision, the general rule 
is that such recovery is the same as the insured could 
recover if the judgment of the insured had been fully 
satisfied. 29A Am. Jur., Insurance, Section 1487. 
In Kleinschmit vs. Farmers Mutual Hail InS'Ulf'Ohl,Ce 
Association, (1939, C.A. 8th Neb.) 101F.2d987, the court 
stated that if the insured has an action against the in-
surer based on a bad-faith failure to compromise a 
claim, the injured third person would also have an action 
against the insurer for the excess of the judgment re-
covered over the policy coverage, under a policy provi-
~ion that in case an execution against the insured on 
final judgment was returned unsatisfied, the judgment 
creditor should have a right of action against the insurer 
to the same extent the insured would have had had he 
paid the judgment. Under the particular facts of this 
case, however, the insured was held not to have had a 
cause of action. 
Automobile Mutual Indemnity Company vs. Shaw, 
134: Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938) held that the injured 
party, who had recovered a judgment against the in-
sured in excess of the policy limits, would be entitled 
to recover the full amount of his judgment from the 
insurer, upon a showing that the insurer was chargeable 
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with bad faith in refusing to negotiate a settlement. The 
policy provided that where the judgment could not be 
collected against the insured, the judgment creditor would 
he vt•sted with tht> insured's rights against the insurer. 
The case of Dillingham vs. Tri-State Insurance Com-
prM1y, :381 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. 1964-), which appellant cites 
as :,;upporting its position in this matter, in fact sup-
ports respondt>nt 's postion. The court stated that in thP 
cast's allowing a judgment creditor to maintain an action 
directly against the insurance company there was a 
provision in the insnrnce policy entitling the judgment 
creditor to recover to the same extent that the insured 
could have done. In the case on appeal heren, the polic~· 
i:,;sned h:· the appellant contains a provision permitting 
the judgment creditor to bring an action directly against 
the insurance company. 
Those cases cited in appellant's brief stating that a 
judgment creditor may not maintain a direct action 
against thP insurer in the absence of a statute or pro-
vision in the policy permitting it to do so are inappli-
cable and eannot he cted as supporting the proposition 
Rtated in Point III of appPllant's brief. 
SPe also Seaboard Mutual Casualty Compmiy vs. 
Profit (4th Civ. Md.) 108 F.2d 597 to the effect that a 
judgment creditor of the insured may maintain a direct 
action against the insurance company under a provision 
in the policy permitting him to do so. 
The case of Paul 1:s. Kirkendall, 6 Ut. 2d 256, 311 
P.2d 37G (1957) cited by appPllant in Point III of its 
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brief to support its position is also inapplicable to the 
question involved herein. In that case an injured third 
party had obtained a judgment against the insured for 
an amount in excess of the policy limits. Judgment 
<'reditor thereafter instituted garnishment proceedings 
against the judt,rinent debtor's insurance carrier in an 
attempt to recover the amount of the judgment in ex-
eess of the eoverage limits. The court held that the 
judgment debtor's tort claim against the garnishee in-
surance carrier could not be adjudicated in the garnish-
ment proceeding. 
The Kirkendall case is distinguishable from the 
instant case in that in that case the liability of the insur-
ance company for the amount of the judgment in excess 
of the policy limits, which was the sub3ect of the gar-
nishment proceedings, had never been litigated. It was 
deemed to be an unliquidated tort claim, the liability 
for which had not been detennined. Therefore, the un-
eertainty of the liability of the insurance company for 
the amount of the judgment in excess of the policy 
limits, because of its bad faith refusal to settle the in-
jun'd party's claim against its insured, prohibited a 
garnishee judgment against the insurance carrier. 
In the instant case, the purpose of the trial was 
to litigate tlw question of the bad faith of Farmers In-
surance Exchange and thereby determine legally its obli-
gation for the amount of the judgment in excess of the 
polic>· limits. Appellant's liability was established at 
the trial and resolved in favor of respondents. 
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If, however, in reviewing the matter most favorably 
to appellant, it could be said that permitting Mr. Soliz 
to maintain an action against the insurance company was 
error, it certainly cannot reasonably be said to have 
heen prejudicial to appellant. It must be conceded that 
Mr. Ammerman is entitled to bring an action against 
his insurance company for its bad faith refusal to settle 
the claim of Mr. Soliz against him. He is a party to 
thf' contract of insurance with appellant; he demanded 
that the company settle the claim within the limits of 
his insurance coverage; he was a party with Mr. Soliz 
in the action against Farmers Insurance Exchange on 
thl:' claim for bad faith refusal to settle the injured par-
ty's claim; he was represented by his own attorney in 
the action against the insurance company; and he recov-
ered a judgment against Farmers Insurance Exchange 
in the instnt case. The fact that Mr. Ammerman did not 
appear personally at the trial cannot be said to have 
heen prejudicial to appellant, because the insurance com-
pany could have compelled his appearance at the trial, 
by means of a subpoena, and could have called him as a 
witness to testify in the case. If prejudice did result 
from Mr. Ammerman's non-appearance at the trial, the 
appellant must shoulder the responsibility for it and can-
not now be heard to complain about its own omission. 
That the law firm of Kipp and Charlier represented 
Mr. Soliz in the Soliz vs. Ammerman case and the case 
of Soliz and Ammerman vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange 
cannot hl-' said to have been prejudicial to appellant. 
However, if appellant so claims, counsel for respondent 
Soliz assumes that the prejudice claimed resulted from 
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the ablilities of the firm. While modesty prompts a 
denial of the prejudice claim, the compliment is graci-
ously accepted. It certanly is not true that the law firm 
of Kipp and Charlier represented Mr. Ammerman; for 
in the Soliz vs. Ammerman case he was represented by 
the law firm of Hanson and Garrett, counsel for Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, and by his own private counsel, 
Mr. Reed H. Richards; and in the case on appeal herein, 
he was represented by Mr. Reed H. Richards (R-138, 
T-1). 
In concluding its argument under Point III of its 
brief, appellant contends that Mr. Soliz was an improper 
party to the lawsuit (1) because he had no rights by 
assignment or otherwise over and above the policy 
amount, and (2) he suffered no damage, since he offered 
to settle the case before trial for $9,000, and had the 
insurance company accepted that offer Mr. Soliz would 
have received $1,000 less than he has received to date. 
In answer to the first contention, the law clearly is that 
because of the policy provisions ref erred to, permitting 
a judgment creditor of the insured to bring a direct action 
against the insurance company, Mr. Soliz was a proper 
party to this law suit. Appellant's second contention is 
unbelievable. Prior to preparation for trial, and even 
after preparation but before trial, Mr. Soliz offered to 
settle for $9,000. This, respondent Soliz feels, was a bar-
gain off er made to avoid a trial which entails consider-
able time, effort, personal and emotional involvement, 
and the dislike of most people to go through a trial. 
Having had this offer rejected by Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, having gone through the trial and having re-
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cPived a judgment against J\l r. Ammerman for $15,000, 
respond<>nt Soliz has heen damaged by not rPceiving the 
full amount he is entitled legally to receive. Prior to 
Uw trial, appellant could have taken advantage of Mr. 
Soliz' bargain off E>r of $9,000. It refused to do so, and 
now bargain day is past. Appellant cannot now claim 
npon any ba::;is that Mr. Soliz has not suffered any dam-
age or is better off by the company's not accepting his 
offer. By the same token, had the insurance company 
acct>ph'd the reasonable offer of $9,000 its insured would 
not have been put in the prejudicial position of having 
a $15,000 jud1-:,11nent against him, and appellant would 
not he in the position of having a judgment against it 
for the t>xcess amount of the policy limits. If appellant 
has lwen prejudicE>d in any way, such prejudice has been 
the result of its own conduct. 
ThP trial court did not err in permitting Mr. Soliz 
to rmrnin in the action as a party plaintff, and in any 
evPnt if the action of the trial court was error in this 
rpgard, it was not prejudicial to aPiwllant. Thus appel-
lant is not Pntitled to a nE>w trial, sincP no prejudicial 
error was committed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented in this case was sufficient 
to suhmit to the jury the question of appellant's bad faith 
in its refusal to settle the Soliz claim within the Ammer-
man insurance policy limits. Ths the trial court properl:· 
did. Negligence is an elPmPnt of had faith, and certainly 
the record supports the condud of the trial court in per 
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mitting the jurors to consider this aspect of the bad 
faith claim. Sorm~ courts have said that fraudulent intent 
or dishonesty are elements of bad faith. Respondents 
ar<> of the opinion that the evidence presented a jury 
question as to whether either or both of these elements 
were present, and a jury could have reasonably found 
that they did. The insurance company refused to offer 
:\Ir. Soliz the amount that it thought his claim was worth, 
viz. $5,000, that being the figure it put on its reserve 
relating to this claim. It made only one settlement offer 
in the amount of $4,500, which was considerably below 
what its own counsel and its experts stated the case was 
worth for settlement purposes. The only offer made was 
only $1,000 above the figure the company thought it 
could get by with paying if the testimony of its doctor 
relative to Mr. Soliz' condition was believed in its entirety 
and the testimony of Mr. Soliz, Mrs. Soliz and Dr. Bern-
son completely disregarded. Appellant's attorney ad-
vised it that if Mr. Soliz had a ruptured disc his claim 
was worth $8,500. This is a figure only $500 less than 
it could have settle the case for. If the claim was worth 
$8,500 appellant could not have expected to get off for 
an amount ess than $9,000, since it would have to pay 
its counsel for trying the case, plus all investigation and 
eourt costs. Apparently the insurance company decided 
to gamble on this case in the hope that it could save 
money, and in doing so gambled to the prejudice of Mr. 
Ammerman, its insured. And again, appellant had an 
activity check on Mr. Soliz by a private investigator who 
was to report to the Claims :Manager of Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange. The activity check was made, hut there 
was a deathly silence by thr company on the results of it. 
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Surely had the surveillance activities of the investigator 
helped to establish that Mr. Soliz was not injured badly, 
appellant would have called the investigator to testify at 
the trial in support of its doctor. The investigator was 
not called, nor was his report introduced into evidence 
for the jury's consideration. Respondents contend that 
these facts present a question of good faith for the jury's 
determination, because reasonable minds could differ on 
whether the conduct of appellant involved fraudulent or 
dishonest intent in their handling of the case as it related 
to settlement of the Soliz claim. 
Respondents respectfully assert that in view of the 
facts in this case and the law, the action of the trial 
judge and the verdict of the jury were proper and correct. 
Therefore, the jury verdict should remain undisturbed, 
and the orders of the trial judge in denying appellant's 
several motions should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
Carman E. Kipp, Esq. 
Tel Charlier, Esq. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Eddie Soliz 
Reed H. Richards, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
Edward Wilson Ammerman 
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